The Idea Of The Naval Attack To Dardanelle:
It was the common view that, it was Churchill who had brought about the war with Turkey. There for Churchill became angry with the Turks. On 17 August the Prime Minister Asquit noted “Winston, in his most bellicose mood all for sending a torpedo flotilla through the Dardanelle’s to sink the Goeben and her consort. Cabinet opinion, however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of State of War and the Secretary of State for India, who argued that it would be damaging for Britain to appear to be the aggressor against the Ottoman Empire.” (1) Churchill continued to press for action. On 1 September he initiated staff talks between the Admiralty and the war office to plan an attack on Turkey in the event of war. The fallowing day he received authority from the Cabinet to sink Turkish vessels if they issued from the Dardanelles in company with the Goeben and Breslau. After getting this authorization Dardanelles Squadron Commander stopped a Turkish torpedo boat on 27 September. Upon this hostile demonstration Enver Pasha authorized the German officer commanding the Turkish defences of the Dardanelles to order the Straits to be sealed off and the complete the laying of minefields across them. This action cut of the Allied merchant shipping because the Dardanelle had been Russia’s one ice-free maritime passageway to the west. Through them Russia sent 50% of her export trade, notably her wheat crop which in turn, to buy arms and ammunition for the war. This was also the result of Churchill’s another fault.
By the end of August Churchill had been violently an anti-Turk. He and Lloyd George were enthusiastic advocates of the Balkan confederation. On 31st August Churchill wrote a private letter to Balkan leaders urging the creation of a confederation of Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro and Greece to join the Allies. On 2 September he initiated private talks with the Greek government to discuss the form that military cooperation between their two countries might take in an offensive operation against Ottoman Empire. He wrote to Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, “ All I am asking is that the interest and integrity of Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.” (2) Churchill and some British politicians were point out in August 1914 that, having the Ottoman Empire for an enemy had its advantages. Free at last to cut up the Ottoman Empire and to offer portions of its territory to other countries at the eventual peace settlement. Britain could now hold out the lure of territorial gains in order to bring Italy and the Balkan countries into the war on her side. (3)
In the Eastern Mediterranean, The British made sure of the two Turkish territories that they held under special arrangements. Cyprus – a leasehold since 1878 and Egypt since 1881- they annexed out of hand on the day that went to war with Turkey. At the Cabinet meeting on November 9 Lloyd George referred to the “ ultimate destiny of Palestine”, and after it Herbert Samuel spoke to Grey about the possible formation of a Jewish state, Mr. Churchill favoured an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula as the best way defending Egypt and Suez Canal, sir John Maxwell, about achieving the same end by an attack on Alexandretta (Iskenderun), where the Baghdad Railway ran near to the cost. And which seemed to Maxwell “The safest and most fruitful” way to embarrass the Turks. In August, when the Greeks offered to place all naval and military resources at the disposal of the Entente Powers was refused because of the Russian objections, and the idea of attacking Alexandretta was more than once discarded because of French susceptibilities about Syria. (4)
In European theatre of war, vast Russian Armies had suffered defeat at Tannenberg and the MasurianLakes; they wanted help in the form of arms and ammunition and they wanted the Turks distracted from their campaign in the Caucasus. If Russia collapsed, Germany’s worst serious worry, that of fighting a war on two fronts was gone. The situation revived an old idea of Winston Churchill, an operation to force Dardanelles and seize Istanbul. (5) At the beginning of 1915 when Lord Kitchener received the requests of Russian High Command for a diversionary attack over Turkish Soils, he changed in mind and very parallel to Churchill’s proposal he accepted a British assault to Dardanelles. Churchill on the morning of 3 January 1915, met his near group at Admiralty to reconsider whether, given the importance of keeping Russia in the war, it really would be out of the question to mount a wholly naval operation. The idea employing only warships that were old and expendable was raised; and the war group decided to ask the commander on the spot for his views. Churchill was interested especially in this concept, despite the difficulties that had been experienced when Admiral Duckwood’s British Fleet had attempted the same manoeuvre, unsuccessfully, in 1807.İn accordance with the concept once the fleet had overcome the decrepit Turkish shore- batteries and entered the Sea of Marmara, it was hoped that Greece, Bulgaria, and perhaps Romania and Italy, would abandon their neutrality and join a Balkan coalition against Turkey; and securing Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara would allow Russian ships again, to pass from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, enabling munitions to be delivered to Russia and Russian grain to the western allies.(6)
When he received the positive answer from the commander British naval squadron off the Dardanelles Admiral Sackville Carden, Churchill convinced the war council that it was the key to shortening the war, which was then in a static situation in France and going badly for Russia. Further, it would possibly forestall some of the Balkan states. Churchill’s brilliant rhetoric and imaginative presentation may have convinced his fellows in the War Council that heavy navy guns and big shells would pulverise the Turkish forts. London had decided to put Admiral Carden’s plan into operation. The plan, which has been termed the only truly innovative strategic concept of the entire war, met with approval from both politicians and military authorities; Kitchener’s approval was doubtless greatly influenced by the fact that few military resources were envisaged, and thus the afford on the Western Front would not be compromised. It was believed that the appearance of British Fleet off Istanbul might cause the downfall of the Turkish Government and as Turkey’s only two munitions factories were within range of naval gunfire, even a short bombardment could effectively remove Turkey from the war at a stroke. As the plan progressed, an increased number of British ships were allocated for the expedition, even the new HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the most powerful ships in the British Navy. (7)
One evening, after dinner Violet Asquit spoke with Lord Kitchener and told him that it was Churchill who would deserve the accolades of triumph. She said, “ If Dardanelles comes off Winston will deserve full and almost sole credit. He has shown such courage and consistency in taking the responsibility throughout all the vacillations of Admiral Fisher and others.” Lord Kitchener replied indignantly “ Not at all. I was always strongly in favour of this operation.” (8)
REFERENCES:
(1) David Fromkin: A Peace The End All Peace, p.65-66 (Avan Books, New York-1990)
(2) D.Fromkin,p.74,75
(3) D.Fromkin,p.74
(4) Elizabeth Monroe: Britain Moments in The Middle East 1914-1956,p.27-28(London-1963)
(5) Joseph Murray: Gallipoli As I Saw It,p.11 ( London-1965)
(6) Philip J.Haythornthwhite: Gallipoli-1915, Frontal assault on Turkey,p.8-9 ( London-1991)
(7) P.J.Haythornthwhite,p.9
(8) David Fromkin,p.135-136
