After the 2003 Iraq war, it was hard to imagine that one day the Turkish prime minister would visit Arbil, the KRG capital, or that this prime minister would be from the AKP. When the AKP assumed power in 2002, Iraqi Kurds thought the new government’s policy would be similar to that of former governments in Turkey. Some people from the Kurdish side thought the AKP government would adopt an ideological policy perhaps supporting Islamic Iraqi Kurdish parties against the Kurdish secular parties that were in power, but this did not happen. Ankara did not support what happened in the city of Sulaimaniya at the beginning of 2011, when some opposition parties, including two Islamic parties, protested against the KRG government in Arbil.
Today, Turkey is trying to deal with all parties, regardless of ideological background, and this may explain the official invitations that were sent by the AKP to Kurdish leaders to participate in their congress. The priority for Turkey today is to develop economic and political interests with the KRG government. It is remarkable that the volume of trade between the two sides is now over $9 billion. This is equal to the trade volume between Iran and Turkey. However, unlike in trade with Iran, the winning side in this trade partnership is in fact Turkey. As a result, Turkey is trying to be a stable element in the region, and this has become clearer to the Kurdish leadership.
In the last few years, Iraqi Kurds have tried to understand the new policy of Turkey towards them and the region, especially after Ahmet Davutoğlu became foreign affairs minister. Finally they welcomed Turkey’s new policy as a good opportunity to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey and also for rapprochement between Arbil and Ankara. On many occasions, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have asked the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to set aside military tactics and choose instead the political struggle as a means to solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The KRG leadership saw a good opportunity to resolve the issue under the AKP government; however, these expectations were weakened with the beginning of clashes in 2010.
AKP congress and invitation of Barzani
Of course, the rapprochement between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey happened under the reign of the AKP government, but this doesn’t mean that Iraqi Kurds are dealing just with Turkey as the AKP government; in my view, Iraqi Kurds today are dealing with Turkey as a state. They are dealing with Turkish state institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy, etc. Moreover, they are dealing with Turkish companies, regardless of ideological and political background. In the last few years, the AKP has not been the only Turkish party to send invitations to Iraqi Kurdish leaders to participate in meetings and conferences; the Republican People’s Party (CHP) sent invitations for the CHP Arab Spring Conference, which was held on April 28-29, for the head of foreign relations of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to participate.
The official invitations from the AKP to Iraqi Kurdish leaders, especially President Barzani, to participate in the congress are unsurprising, not just because of the current progress in Turkish-Iraqi Kurd relations, but also because of the role Barzani plays as an element of stability in the region. His international position may also explain the invitation. Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish participation will help social conditions on both sides. Turkish companies and Kurdish traders who are dealing with Turkey can feel more comfortable in doing business with each other.
The AKP congress and its effect on relations with Baghdad
It was expected that mutual issues would be the subject of talks between AKP leaders and the Kurdish delegation, especially the situation in Syria, relations between Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad and the PKK issue. Thus the congress provided an opportunity for Kurdish leaders to know and understand the new attitudes of the AKP towards the resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and to discuss what Iraqi Kurds could do to find a political solution to that issue, particularly following recent statements from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regarding the possibility of opening talks with Abdullah Öcalan.
It is expected that the participation of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in the AKP congress will cause further deterioration between Ankara and Baghdad, especially after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to attend the congress. However, I think the participation of Barzani comes at a good time in terms of improving relations. For many Kurds, Barzani is one of the symbols of Kurdish nationalism, and his participation is a message to show that both groups (Turks and Kurds) can live together and talk together.
Barzani participated in the AKP congress as president of the KRG as well as president of the KDP. Most people who came with him were top officials of the KDP. We can see that Barzani’s attendance has brought the KDP closer to Turkey than the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq.
We could say the vice president of the KDP and the current prime minister of the KRG, Nechervan Barzani, are the real engineers of Turkish-Iraqi Kurd relations, having succeeded in maintaining bridges between Ankara and Arbil during tensions between both sides in past years. Until now, the leaders of the AKP have regarded cooperation with Barzani as necessary to the resolution of the PKK issue, and a few days ago both Massoud Barzani and Nechervan Barzani welcomed the statements of Erdoğan regarding the possibility of opening talks with Öcalan. It is expected that both sides will announce some new ideas and attitudes in relation to the resolution of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Moreover, today top officials of the Iraqi Kurds are looking at Turkey as a new ally, after the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq at the end of 2011. After Barzani’s statement of self-determination last March, many Iraqi Kurds thought that Turkey would be the first country to recognize any Kurdish state in Iraq. In the past, some Turkish newspapers have argued that since the Kurdish uprising in March 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan is a threat to Turkish national security. However, due to the rapid progress in relations between Turkey and the KRG in the last few years, it is expected that the Kurdish region of Iraq will be an element for stability and security for Turkey. We could say the Kurdish region has played the role of a buffer zone between Turkey and other parts of Iraq, where instability and violence became prevalent after 2003.
*Dr. Aziz Barzani is an adviser at the International Middle East Peace Research Center