Analyst Perthes: Border skirmishes with Syria do not need to develop into war

Since Syrian bombardments hit Turkish villages recently, Turkey has responded by shelling Syrian army positions and moved troops to the border, threatening to retaliate if there is further cross-border bloodshed. The Turkish government, which has a strong Assad stance, infuriated Damascus last week when it forced a passenger plane flying from Russia to Syria to land in Ankara. Turkish authorities said it was carrying Russian-made munitions for the Syrian army, a charge denied by Damascus and Moscow.

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad counts on the support of Russia and Iran, and the Western powers show no interest in intervening in Syrian affairs despite approximately 30,000 people having been killed since the uprising began against the Syrian regime in March last year.

Perthes said that if the Syrian opposition unifies and forms administrations in Syria, they could then negotiate with the rest of the world for arms deals and even for some sort of protection.

He answered our questions in İstanbul where he was a participant in the İstanbul Forum last week organized by the Center for Strategic Communication (STRATIM).

Will the Syrian regime end?

The Syrian regime will definitely end, but we don’t know how long it will take, we don’t know when it will end, and we don’t know how it will end. We also don’t know who is going to replace it and if there will be a somewhat orderly transition. All of that depends on a lot of different factors. The longer it takes, the more difficult it will be to have an orderly material and political reconstruction of the country.

What are your observations about the Syrian leadership and command structure? Has it been broken down yet?

We have to admit that there are a lot of things that we don’t know exactly. It seems from the outside that the command structure is still intact. That can be partly explained because he [Bashar al-Assad] has never used the entire army to fight the uprising; he has concentrated on parts of the army that are particularly loyal — the Republican Guards and the brigades commanded by his brother. His command structure is apparently okay, but the problem is that individual soldiers are deserting his army, and quite a number of soldiers are trying to avoid fighting. That doesn’t mean that the regular army has broken down — it’s certainly weakened, and it is relying on perhaps 20 percent of all the armed forces of Syria. That still seems enough to keep him in power. The real risk for the regime now is that there are clashes between pro and anti-Assad Alawite militias, especially in his hometown Qardahah. If that increases — Alawites with the president and Alawites against the president fighting one another — it would undermine his home bases and credibility when he tells not only Alawites but also the minorities and secular parts of his country that “we are here to defend you.” Because militias from his own community are fighting other militias from his own community, then it is clear that it is not about protecting the minorities but an anarchic civil war between different persuasions.

‘Chance for political solution getting smaller’

A lot of people in the world and in Turkey are morally outraged by what’s going on in Syria, and they want to stop Assad. On the other hand, the majority of the West, including the United States, does not seem to be pro-intervention in the case of Syria. I know from your writings that you are very concerned about an outside intervention. Do you still hold to the same opinion?

Everyone is intervening in one way or other, and there are different levels of intervention. There is political intervention. Basically all the EU states do it, the US does it and Turkey does it, in different ways. And there is something in between, supporting those who fight by training or giving them bases, etc. I am very cautious here because some of the ideas on the table have not been thought through to the end. If you speak of a buffer zone or a protection zone, which is a legitimate idea, it also has its own difficulties because it would only protect those who are in the protection zone. It doesn’t help the population in Damascus or Homs. If you speak of a full-scale military intervention — an Iraq type of intervention and no one is really doing that — that would mean that there would have to be NATO forces. That would also include a responsibility to administer and rebuild the country afterwards because such an intervention would destroy many structures, and those who win by force of the intervention would rely on the interveners to help with rebuilding. Americans have had that responsibility in Iraq, and it was not implemented in the best way; Iraq was plunged into a long civil war afterwards, and no one wants to repeat that. We all have not done very well in Afghanistan where we took the responsibility on our shoulders. So we are talking about intermediate levels of intervention. And even that would have conditions.

*** Is there still a chance for a political solution?

The chance for a political solution is getting smaller; the longer it takes, the more difficult it will be. At some point, realistically, we will probably have something like a safe heaven or protection zone in parts of the country, but that would have conditions.

‘Syrian opposition has to unify to negotiate with world’

What are those conditions?

The main condition here lies with the Syrian opposition. The Syrian opposition has to unify to create an umbrella organization that speaks for all relevant forces in the opposition. Today we do have the Syrian National Council [SNC], but not everybody finds himself or herself represented in it; so some people say that there is a need for an umbrella group that goes beyond the SNC, speaks for the opposition and has one goal — which is to make a transition possible in the country. Then they can organize according to their political differences and hold elections, etc. So that would be step number one: to have a credible, unified opposition. And the second step would be for the opposition to be unified militarily. There are four military councils now, and this is better than having hundreds of militia groups. And then the opposition needs to form administrations in liberated areas — in a big city like Aleppo or even in some smaller cities like Idlib. If they manage to set up a credible administration, it is much easier for them to call for help. That would create a “Benghazi case” where you would have an administration that could be an alternative and could negotiate with the rest of the world. It could negotiate arms deals, and it could even negotiate for some sort of protection. It would be different than in intervening in a civil war situation where you have one government and a couple of militias.

Some people say that setting up an administration is unfair, while they are still bombed by Assad’s air force…

I have to admit that international politics is unfair, but no one is going to support a side that does not show that they can administer. You have to show that you can deliver.

‘Turkey should be open to all forces in Syrian opposition’

What can Turkey do? And my next question is going to be about what things that Germany can do.

Turkey is much closer to the events than Germany and is being more involved politically. One important message to Turkey is that it shouldn’t try to pick winners; it shouldn’t try to adopt one faction over other factions. And the same advice goes to the others who do that in a much more explicit way than Turkey do, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who are adopting certain factions within the opposition very, very clearly. Turkey is sort of in between, not picking winners and leaning toward one faction; of course Turkey is closer to the Muslim Brothers than the Germans are for example, and this is understandable given the composition of the government in Turkey. But Turkey should be open to all the forces in the opposition and thereby say that the more unified the opposition is, the more it includes all political and ethnic tendencies in Syria, the larger its chance for success. Turkey should be neutral in that regard. And of course, Turkey will be the place from which support is going to be delivered to the Syrian opposition, be that humanitarian support or support for a transitional government.

Germany?

Germany, far from the front, has decided to try to support the transition process. It is laying the groundwork for a process that will start at some point; we don’t know when it is going to start, but when there is a transitional government, the day after the current regime, then a lot of work is needed to make that economically viable, politically sustainable and to speak about rule of law, transitional justice, transitional security and how to deal with the arms and militias around. This is what is proper for Germany to do.

‘Mukhabarat has ruled Syria’

Looking at the escalating tension between Turkey and Syria, do you think Turkey is likely to find itself in a de facto war?

At this stage, it is something that Turkey can decide. Yes, mortar shells have been falling onto Turkey, and they have been killing people. Turkey has a right to respond under international law, and it did. But this is what we call border skirmishes, not a war, and it does not need to develop into a war. Wars do not simply break out; it is always political decision makers who decide on that. Neither side — neither the Syrian side, nor the Turkish side — has an interest in launching a war.

You lived in Syria…

25 years ago.

How similar was yesterday’s Syria to today’s Syria?

It was very different, and it was very similar. It was different because it was the time of East-West confrontation and the Cold War. It was in the age before globalization and liberalization. Syria was poorer, less developed, people were less educated, almost no one on the streets would speak English, you had few foreign products imported, and there was a socialist economic system. The modernization process started under Hafez al-Assad and continued under Bashar al-Assad, but much of the authoritarian political structure has not changed. Bashar al-Assad decided to modernize the economy but explicitly not to reform the political system. The political system is basically the same. Still, al-Mukhabarat [the Syrian intelligence service] has been ruling the country; there has been no space for dissent.

Turkish leadership attempted to approach Assad to advise him on democratic reforms but to no avail.

I have a lot of sympathy for the approach. In Germany, we know Bashar al-Assad is not a democrat, but he wants to modernize the country, so let’s help him and hope that with modernization, a better education system and a more open economy, some sort of political opening will follow. We tried to do that thorough the Euro Mediterranean. Turkey was complementing the EU approach to Syria. We tried, and we failed.

‘Russia should tell Assad his situation not sustainable’

Then there is the position of Iran and Russia, which do not want any international intervention.

The situation is fluid but not as fluid as we wish. Iran thinks that Tehran won because Assad did not fall in the last year-and-a-half. Iran and Russia have interests in Syria that they want to preserve. In both Iran and Russia, there are people in the government who ask if they are really preserving their interests if they hold on to Bashar al-Assad, and if they have a plan B [when or if] Bashar al-Assad does not succeed. Most analysts in Russia would privately tell you that Bashar al-Assad will not prevail, but they are thinking of forms of transition that could include Bashar al-Assad. Russia has a second or third agenda here, an extreme fear for Islamic movements, which is understandable if you look through the Caucasus; Russia is threatened by armed Islamic militants. It would be better for Syria if the transition starts soon. Russia doesn’t want any international intervention. Even the Iranians have been saying lately that you cannot ignore the opposition, the uprising. If we want a sustainable transition, we need Iran and Russia in the game. Russia, being one of the most important international allies of Syria, can tell Assad that his situation is not sustainable. Like we Germans, you Turks tell this to Assad, but he will not listen. He may listen to the Russians.

‘Offering Assad exit, important for Syrians’ future’

How important is it to find a safe exit for Assad for the post-Assad period in Syria?

I don’t care about his personal fate, but it is very important for Syrians for the post-Assad period. It is important for him to know that there is an alternative to killing and being killed. For the president and his closest family, the exit could be exile somewhere, like Ben Ali’s exile [former president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali] to Saudi Arabia, an opportunity to go to Russia or Venezuela, etc. If Russians tell him that they don’t want to take him, some country is probably going to take him. If you don’t have an exit option, then you are fighting and destroying your own house. By offering an exit, you would also say to the Alawite community and others who are still supporting Assad that it’s not about revenge, it’s not about killing those who have been killing, but it’s about a whole new beginning.

‘Turkey’s EU membership might be like UK’s

In 2010, you had an article on the role of Turkey in the Middle East, and you had recommendations for Turkey not to be overconfident, to realize its limitations and not to de-emphasize its NATO membership. I wonder if you still have similar observations.

I would still stick to the recommendations, they were right. I was convinced that Turkey can achieve more in its mediation role between Arabs and non-Arabs. I still applaud the efforts of PM [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan to mediate a peace agreement between Syria and Israel. It was the right thing to do; it was courageous to do it, and it was proactive to do it. He failed, but he was not to blame for the failure; it was the Israelis and Syrians who were not able to come together. This is political life; you try things, but do not succeed all the time and try again. Turkey was a bit overconfident about its soft power within the community of Arab states. And sometimes it has overlooked Arab states that were happy to have Turkish support; they sometimes looked at Turkey as a model — one should be cautious because different states have their particular idea of Turkey — but they don’t really want Turkey to become a dominant force in the Arab world. There were certain fears of new Ottoman aspirations. As long as it is Turkey mediating between an Arab country and parties outside the Arab world, as long as it is trade relations, Turkey’s services are accepted. The EU states should see that Turkey is a very well-placed partner. Culturally, it is easier for a Turkish entrepreneur to move in Iraq than it is for a German or a French entrepreneur. There is a certain affinity that makes it easier. I do think that Turkey when acting in the Arab world, or even the broader Middle East including Iran, they de-emphasized NATO membership too much. It is still the case a little bit. As Turkish leaders say that Turkey is a member of NATO and an EU candidate. And the soft power of Turkey comes from being a combination of Muslim and Western at the same time — being part of the Western alliance, being part of Europe and being a successful Muslim country at the same time. So it would be a mistake to try to construct two camps, Western camp and an Islamic camp, and then put Turkey into the Islamic camp. I even think that it’s a mistake to speak of Turkey as a bridge between the one and the other because it is not a very active role to be a bridge.

Do you have a better metaphor?

I would say that Turkey is a strong and important member of NATO; Turkey is a European power that also plays in other geopolitical regions. That goes for other European powers too. So there is no contradiction to being a European power and also having a geopolitical reach into other regions. There is no reason to deemphasize the linkage to NATO. In the Arab League, it is good that Turkey shows up and its voice is heard. In NATO, Turkey is a full member and in the EU, unfortunately not yet. EU needs Turkey, and Turkey should be a member.

You see Turkey’s membership still likely?

There is political resistance by some European countries. And there are obstacles as we recently heard from Stefan Füle [the enlargement and European neighborhood policy commissioner], but that doesn’t mean that the situation will not change. Maybe at some point Turkey will be an EU member like the United Kingdom, which is not a second class membership but a form of membership as some parts of the integration are chosen and some are not. I would wish Turkey to be part of the common security and defense policy. I’m not sure that everybody in Turkey who favors full membership in the EU has thought it through because you have to deliver some sovereignty to Brussels. I suspect that you have a number of policy makers in Turkey who would rather like to have a British type of membership — of course in the common market, and some integration but not all because Turkey is quite sovereignistic — maybe closer to the United Kingdom in its mentality than to Germany. I’m not proposing a certain format here but trying to say that forms of integration with the EU will remain fluid as talks will continue over the eurozone. It should be possible to find a place where Turkey can be happy and that Europe will be happy with.

PROFILE

Dr. Volker Perthes

Since October 2005, he has been the director and executive chairman of the board of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) based in Berlin. In 1992-2005, he was the senior research associate at the SWP, and head of the Middle East and Africa Division up to March 2005. Previously, in 1991-1993, he was an assistant professor at the American University of Beirut. He has his PhD from Duisburg University. His areas of expertise are German and European foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations and the Middle East. His books include “Syria under Bashar al-Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change” (Routledge, July 2006), and “The Political Economy of Syria Under Assad (I. B. Tauris, 1997).

(Today’s Zaman)