Since the ‘Arab revolutions’ of 2011, a number of factors have contributed to destabilising the region, including the growing divide between Sunnis and Shiites, increasing radicalisation, tribal and regional disputes, weakening state institutions, and the shrinking of political space. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya, the absence of credible political processes for addressing grievances has created conditions favourable to radicalisation. In the absence of genuine political debate, ethnic, sectarian and tribal differences have resurfaced as important markerslike identity, and become drivers of conflict. Libya is a case in point: while its people are generally ethnically homogenous, tribal and religious identities have been exploited to ‘invent’ hatred between communities. The closing of political space in many countries in the region has contributed to the rise of extremist groups like The Islamic State (IS), and to the marginalisation of Islamist movements in general. Regarding the latter, failure by the governments of the region to distinguish between Islamist movements and radical Islamists is bound to threaten societal cohesion in the longer term.
Echoes of the “Great Game” played out in Afghanistan between Great Britain and Russia more than a hundred years ago can be heard from the decades-long strategic rivalry for power and influence between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf and The Arabian Sea. It is built mostly along sectarian and ideological lines – Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world, and Iran as the leader of the Shia Muslim world.
What is behind today’s Iran-Saudi conflict? The ethnic hatreds explanation is becoming worryingly convincing. There are 75 million Iranians and less than 30 million Saudis. And most of the people in Saudi Arabia are not themselves Saudi citizens which brings up the curious question of loyalty during a crisis. Saudi Arabia has a Shiite population which may encompass as much as 15%. This minority has been severely oppressed by the Saudi government and clergy, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni Muslim and there has been little done to salve the hurt feelings caused by this repression. Iran being majority Shiite could easily find support among the disaffected members of Saudi’s Sh’ia community and use those members as a “fifth column.” Or, even better for Iran, it could be presumed by the Saudis that they couldn’t trust Shiites and additional forces would need to be deployed just to prevent a possible Shiite uprising. This would take needed troops away from the battle with Iran.
While recent high-level intermediary diplomatic discussions between the Saudis and Iranians would suggest a possible thawing in their cold relations, the fact of the matter is, too much bad blood exists between them for any meaningful, long-term resumption, at least in the near-term. The more likely game play is that they are simply reviewing their contingency strategies, taking into account all the events in the region, and preparing their next moves on the Middle East chessboard.
Despite general agreement that the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme were of historic importance, contrasting views exist on how they are likely to affect the region and Iran’s role therein.The nuclear talks were, according to some observers, an exceptional opportunity for peace and stability in the region:the achievement of a negotiated, fair and balanced agreement that would represent a rare success for the forces of moderation, in a region otherwise afflicted by increasing conflict and extremism.
A nuclear agreement might even lead towards a broader regional understanding that would promote order and stability, and assuage the security concerns of States in the region including Iran itself. This could, for example, be achieved through the future negotiation of a regional security framework.By contrast, others warned of possible negative consequences of a nuclear deal. For example, lifting sanctions against Iran, a key element of the deal would provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with additional finances with which to support actors involved in fomenting conflict, such as Hezbollah.
Saudis worry that Iran’s support to such groups not only generates instability in the region, but also fuels a sense of threat among Sunni Arab States. Iran’s considerable influence over parts of the region, including Syria and Yemen, contend that this leverage is being used to disrupt regional stability and advance what Iran perceives to be its strategic interests. In Syria, for example, Iran’s support to the regime has contributed to unspeakable human misery. However, Iran counters that numerous international actors are feeding the conflict in Syria, and that regional instability is largely a product of Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have fuelled extremism. In that context, Iran’s voice is in fact, one of moderation.
In their efforts to demonstrate regional supremacy, Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in a series of proxy wars to undermine each other throughout the Middle East. In Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Iran works behind the scenes to undermine those governments through the Shiite communities, a threat Saudi Arabia takes so seriously that they sent military forces into Bahrain in 2011 to help quell the Shiite uprising there. And then there is Yemen. The Yemen card is a strategic bargaining chip that Iran may now be holding vis-a-vis the sudden rise of the Houthis. Regarding Yemen, the conflict can be solved only politically, not militarily. There, Iran is well positioned to exploit its influence over Ansar Allah by encouraging the movement to negotiate in good faith. In Lebanon, it’s the Iran-backed Hezbollah. In Syria, it’s the long-time Iran-backed Assad regime. In Iraq, it’s an Iran-backed Shiite government which was, prior to the US invasion in 2003, solidly in the Sunni camp. While recognising on-going bilateral problems including border disputes with some neighbours, Iran had, since President Rouhani’s election in 2013, redoubled its efforts to improve relations with its neighbours, particularly Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman and Turkey. However, some critics maintain that many states in the regions till distrust Iran’s intentions vis-à-vis the region. A common refrain is that prospects for long-term stability in the region will depend largely on an improvement in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Analysts argue the premise that inclusive political processes which are mostly not being pursued by the region’s governments could contribute to greater stability in the region.
Iran is separating lines in the sand. Both Iraq and Syria serve as buffers between Iran and the Sunni Middle East, so having stable and dependable Shiite-led governments in each serves as a strategic objective that is non-negotiable for Iran. By drawing it, Iran would seek to pressure Saudis to think carefully in Iraq and Syria or risk a planned effort to further undermine them from their regional border. The question now is, will Iran make their stand or blink? And so now the New Great Game goes on.
