Japan Policy in the Middle East

This study investigates various internal and external factors influencing Japanese attitudes towards the Middle East, with particular emphasis on its changes from the low political profile during the Cold War era to the participation in the post Gulf War, and eventually to the engagement in the post 9/11 era. The study concluded that in addition to the various domestic and external factors such as the anti-military constitution internally, and the structure of international system externally, the basic components that have constantly played a major role in Japan’s foreign policy towards the Middle East during the Cold War (low political profile) and after the Cold War (a higher political involvement), were the oil factor and the American factor. As such Japan will pursue her policy toward the region within two-line framework: complete coordination with the US, and independent efforts to show her own contribution to the stability and peace in the region.

Japan has essential economic relations with the Middle East, particularly with oil-producing countries. It has been a main customer of the region’s energy since the early 1980s, and therefore its economic has been vulnerable to serious interruptions in supply and increase in the prices of crude oil, natural gas and other raw materials upon which it mainly depends. However, and in spite of such an economic profile, the Japanese political involvement in the region has been historically low and limited. Indeed, there has been a vast disparity between Japan’s great dependence on the raw materials of the Middle East and the level of its political and diplomatic engagement in the region.[1] This situation has prevailed for decades even though, apart from its Asian neighborhood and possibly its alliance with the United State, no other region has such an apparent impact on the prosperity and even security of Japanese people. Despite the fact that the 1973 oil crisis was a chock and represented a very strong incentive for Japan to realize the importance of the Middle East economically and politically in the international system, and therefore rethinking its ‘introverted’ policy toward the region, the Japanese political moves during the 1970s and 1980s remained cautious or reluctant.

However, since the beginning of 1990s, Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East has been witnessing important transformations. There are signs that Japan’s historic policy toward the region is now changing. The most important changes which left critical impacts possibly on the whole Japanese foreign behavior, appeared directly after the demise of bipolarity concurrent with the end of the Gulf War in 1991. This change started with the issue of ‘burden sharing’ related to the Gulf War. In spite of its generous contributions to the costs of that war, Japan has not received the appreciation or thankfulness it deserved. The US disapproval or underestimation of Japan’s contribution created a chock among the Japanese who started to seriously believe that reluctant policy or keeping its head down was not practical and therefore would not be useful in the long run. Japan according should play a more active role in the international arena and enhance its political involvement in the Middle East. Truly, Japan started to move and there have been various events demonstrating a new approach. Japan’s participation in the Madrid conference in 1991, its leading role in the multilateral negations in the Middle East, its growing role in the United Nations peacekeeping missions, participating in the disengagement troops between Israel and Syria in the Golan Height, dispatching self defense soldiers to the region for the first time, the diplomatic engagement between conflicting parties, and the unprecedented Japanese interest in expanding its investments in the region are all evidences that Japan has altered its traditional policy toward the region. Here, it should be noticed that the September 11^th attacks on the US have been utilized by right-leaning and conservative voices in Japan not only to expand their country’s role in the international arena, but also to strengthen the US-Japan alliance which was negatively affected by trade frictions during the 1990s. Consequently and this is seen a very important sign of change, Japan became a key ally of the US in the so called war on terror. So what are the main factors or obstacles that prevented Japan from involving politically in the Middle East in earlier stages? Was this a policy option? What are the main factors or incentives motivating Japan to rethinking its traditional policy and enhance its political and diplomatic engagement in the region?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the detrainment factors that were responsible for the Japanese low political involvement in the Middle East during the Cold War, and the motivating factors that contributed to the growing Japanese political engagement in the region in the region in the post-Cold War period.

REFRAINING AND PUSHING FACTORS

Interaction Level

Ensuring Oil Supply

Japan emerged as a major economic power in the beginning of the 1960s and has since become the second largest economy in the world. Its technological advancement and economic “miracle” have been associated with a vast dependence on the Middle East’s crude oil. Japan has been, and continues to be, dependent totally on external sources to meet its petroleum needs. Statistic may give a clearer and more accurate indicator about the Japanese reliance on the Middle East: It currently imports 99 percent of its oil needs; 90 percent of this is coming from the Middle East.[2] These proportions shows us that the great importance of the Middle East for Japan’s economy and prosperity. Therefore, securing a smooth flow of crude oil from the Middle East has been always a priority in Japanese foreign policy.[3] Thus, energy, particularly oil, has been the dominant economic element in the Japanese approach to deal with the Middle East. Since the beginning of oil production in the region, the international oil companies known as the majors’-f which the majorities were American- have dominated the world oil market. Unlike its Western allies, Japan was interested more in obtaining cheap oil provided by these companies, rather than investing overseas or engaging in exploration ventures. That is why the majority of Japan’s oil until 1981 was supplied by the American or Euro-American companies and not by the Middle East itself. It was only in the early 1980s that oil deals with the Middle East oil-producing countries, specially the national oil companies of producers, have began to supply more than half of Japan’s imported oil.

In consequence, Japan did not have to formulate its own position regarding the region; the dependence of Japan on the Majors to secure its oil needs and protect its economic interests in the region associated with the absence of a real Japanese realization of the possible cut of oil supplies before the 1973 crisis, represented the historically main reasons for Japan to stay away from the Middle East and its complicated issues.

The National/Unit Level

The Anti-Military Constitution

After the American nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan unconditionally surrendered and was consequently occupied by the US army under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. In order to prevent the future rise of Japanese militarism, Mac Arthur, who was also the Super-Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was not only engaged in demilitarizing and democratizing Japan, but also involved in its geographic dismemberment. Another agenda for US occupational authority was to revise the Japanese constitution. During this period, for the purpose of preserving the US national security, the US tried to disarm Japan completely.[4] This policy, incorporated in Article 9 of Japan constitution, renounced forever “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”

‘Economy First’ Policy and One-Party Dominance

After the Second World War, Japan also became a democratic country based on party pluralism. As a result of difficult economic conditions because of the war, there was an urgent need to rebuild the economy and improve living standards of the Japanese people. Because reaching this target was not possible without the American assistance, ideas of ‘economy first’ preoccupied the minds of both elites and the people in Japan. Then, the general features of the new Japanese approach to the world did not involve any practice of political or cultural influence or any desire to practice international hegemony. Because the alliance with the US provided Japan with a security umbrella to protect its territories and maintain its trade and economic interests overseas, the efforts of the Japanese government under Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) concentrated on the economy, while security matters and other related political moves were left to the US. However, this does not mean that Japan was totally following the US policy with regards to the Middle East. On the contrary, Japan government, for instance, chose more independence policy toward the region under one party dominance system. But it seems that the tendency of formulating foreign policy in terms of economic interests led to underestimating the challenges of relations with the Middle East, an area where critical economic issues cannot be easily separated from deeper political strategic issues. So abstracting economic relations from their context was, according to a former Japanese diplomat, ‘quite natural for the Japanese of that time’.[5]

International Level

Bilateral Polarity during the Cold War

The structure of the international system during Cold War was bipolar. It was dominated by the US and the Soviet Union. As result of intense competition between the two superpowers each of them was in need of key allies in confronting the other. Japan was far more passive than the allies of the United States in Western Europe and it did not even try to lay the groundwork that was necessary in order to establish itself in international arena or in the region. What happens in the Middle East has a way of affecting America and what affects Americans has a way of affecting other people, including the Japanese, and it is for this reason that the America factor came to represent a predominant political element of the Japanese attitude towards the Middle East during the Cold War. This situation in which Japan, one may argue, enjoyed a unique advantage, contributed to the Japan’s low political profile in the region. Moreover, the nature of rivalry and struggle during the Cold War did not enable Japan, or any other major powers, to move politically outside the framework or room allowed by the two superpowers.

Alliance with the US

Since the US continue to be the key player in the Middle East and has taken the lead in maintaining security and stability in the region, Japan seems to be now more liberated or freer, than would otherwise be the case, to pursue more specific interests of its own or to simply stay away and marginalized herself. Japan, which is heavily dependent on the oil of the region, knows that the US is committed to secure oil supplies and other raw materials, and is willing to bring its power to bear for that end. This situation was in favor of Japan and eventually helped Japan achieved its prosperity. But this prosperity is one of incurring relatively low costs for the maintenance of Middle East stability by letting the United States indulge its propensity to run the entire situation there. Japan’s contribution therefore is not commensurate with the costs the US bears to secure its oil supply and to protect its alliances interests. This had led the Americans to characterize Japan as a `free rider` on Middle East security. Free rider the issue together with other associated developments, has contributed in one way or another to rethinking Japan’s foreign policy in general and its Middle East policy in particular.

In this context, Japan is not only concerned with enhancing her policy in the region, but also, in certain cases, distinguishing herself from the US. Japan’s interest in the region is much more narrowly focused and Japan’s ability to apply pressure or coercion is much more limited. Consequently, there will be a natural tendency for Japan to seek a measure of dissociation from US policy and to pursue its own priorities through separate arrangements with states willing to do this. The constant dilemma of Japanese policy, therefore, is how to differentiate itself from the United States in certain specific instances while still remaining within, and contributing to, the overall security umbrella maintained principally by the US. Such a complicated but pressing situation invokes Japan to think independently with respect to the Middle East and to pursue a more active policy and diplomatic efforts through which Japan shows its own contribution to the peace and stability in the region.[6]

FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE FOREING POLICY IN THE REGION      

According to the previous analysis, Japan foreign policy toward the Middle has started to change gradually after 1973. Since then, three layers or lines in Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East can be detected: One is based on lowest or very limited political positions favoring peace and neutrality that accord with Japan’s perception of itself in the world after the Second World War, and its role as an active member of the UN; another is based on complete coordination and harmony with the US efforts to maintain stability in the region and to ensure uninterrupted flow of oil; the other contains occasional efforts to take an independent Japanese role, at least in specific cases where an excessively close identification with the US policy seems to put Japanese interests at risk, as seems to be the case in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program. The last line can be divided into short-term measures designed to meet an immediate interest or need as happened after the 1973 crisis when Japan decided to act independently, or long-term policies in which Japan makes its own, distinctive contribution to Middle Eastern stability and development as seen in the Prosperity and Peace Corridor Initiative.

Japanese participation in the Madrid Conference in the end of 1991 just one month before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its leading role in the multilateral negotiations as an organizer and a participant in the Middle East Peace Process, in addition to its initiatives to facilitate peace process between Palestinians and Israel reinforce the importance of the last layer in Japan’s foreign policy and indicate that Japan’s policy in the region transformed form purely economic terms to concentrate more on issues of regional stability in the long run. It seems that Japanese leaders and policy makers are aware that economic issues cannot be dealt with separately or in isolation from social and political factors, and that reliance on market forces alone or short-term positions based on ‘actions and reaction’ policy to achieve immediate interest have been ineffective. Hence Japan’s policy in the Middle East has moved from indistinct support of peace and concern about specific economic interests, to a greater focus on long-term stability, whether in coordination with the United States or independently. Japanese good relations with all parties enable it to be a good mediator, at least when the US fails to do so.

There are a number of particular strengths that Japan can bring to this endeavor. Obviously economic contributions are important, especially as greater emphasize on development emerges as one of the keys. But this role should be conceived as not only a donor, but also as a mentor and model. Japan’s involvement raises much less suspicion in the area, and Japan’s economic success has been an inspiration and example in the Middle East as elsewhere. During the 1990s, Japan has been the largest aid donor in the world and key contributor to various regional states. There are also political, diplomatic, and even security issues in which Japan can make a distinctive contribution.

In the military and security area, the post September 11 th events show that Japan wants to expand its military presence outside its national borders. There are obvious endeavors not only to improve capabilities of self defense troops to be able to deploy within the US peacekeeping missions, as in Cambodia and Golan Heights, but also to make changes in the structure and mission of this troops in the future. Providing logistic support for the US troops in Afghanistan, dispatching armed Japanese soldiers to Iraq, upgrading the Defense Agency into a minister of defense, and attempting to amend the constitution are all evidences of the new Japanese approach to the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

Various internal and external factors have contributed to the low Japanese political engagement in the Middle East during the Cold War. These factors can be analyzed at three level of analysis: national, interaction and international system levels. With respect to the first level, the Majors together with the Japanese unconsciousness of the importance of the Middle East in the international politics and the fears of negative consequence of any political engagement contributed to the low political involvement of Japan in the region. At the national level, the legacy of the Second World War directed the Japanese way of thinking toward not only concentrating on economy, but also refusing remilitarize or any expansion to the scope of foreign policy. Therefore, there was a general agreement among Japanese people on the peaceful nature of the constitution. At the international level, the conditions of Cold War and the struggle between the superpower associated with the US-Japan alliance represented restrictions on the Japanese foreign behavior. In spite of positive impacts of this situation on the Japanese economy, it was reflected in low political involvement and, thus limited influence in one of the most important regions for the welfare and prosperity of Japanese people. Though the first two oil crises have left significant impact on Japan’s perception of the region, Japanese political involvement during the 1970s and 1980s remained relatively low and limited to the degree that allowed oil flow and maintaining economic bilateral relations with the Middle Eastern countries. This, despite the fact that it was influenced by the previous internal and external factors, indicates that Japan’s low political engagement in the Middle East during the Cold War was basically a policy option motivated historically by the Japanese behavior in East and Southeast Asia before and during the Second World War. This additionally represented a psychological pressure on Japanese ruling elites not to engage politically or militarily in the international arena.

Things in perception and practice started to chance seriously since the beginning of 1990s. After the end of the Cold War 1991, Japan began to adopt a more active and long run foreign policy that is based on participation rather than observation. It participated in Madrid conference in 1991 and engaged in the Middle East peace process especially in the multilateral tracks. Moreover, it has sent Self Defense members to Golan Heights and dispatched Japanese soldiers overseas to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, it has recently increased its diplomatic efforts to enhance the peace process between Arabs and Israelis according to the Japanese vision reflected in the “Peace and Prosperity Corridor” initiative.

As a final conclusion, it is noticed that the basic components that have constantly played a major role in Japan’s policy towards the Middle East during (low involvement) and after (higher involvement) the Cold War, were the oil factor on one hand, and the American factor, on the other. They, in addition to be presented at the various levels, are largely interrelated and overlapping. The huge American influence in the region and its oil companies’ control of the world oil markets make the US the main guarantors to a smooth oil flow to its allies, including Japan. All these, together with the absence of a comprehensive and lasting peace between the Arabs and Israelis, will push Japan to broaden and expand its political involvement in the region and show its own independent role in achieving regional stability through “development diplomacy.”